Monopoly Politics: Price Competition and Learning in the Evolution of Policy Regimes (working title)
My dissertation project examines why overall approaches to economic policy tends to alternate between consistently favoring price competition and market power. While contemporary commentary increasingly focuses on the current monopoly problem of technology giants, particularly in the United States, I place this problem in a broader historical context where most advanced industrial states have seen large and consistent shifts in policy approaches that favor enforcing price competition or directly promoting market power. Using a mix of historical statistics and original archival research in the United States and France, I argue that policies in favor of either competition or market power are inherently self-limiting in the long run, and states only shift policy to fix the resulting economic problems though an extended process of learning and bureaucratic reorganization.
Erik Peinert (2018) Periodizing, paths and probabilities: why critical junctures and path dependence produce causal confusion, Review of International Political Economy, 25:1, 122-143, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2017.1387586
“Comparative Advantage vs. Price Competition: Trade Mechanisms and their Distinct Political Implications”
“Trade Competition and Foreign Policy Preferences: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition in the United States”